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The effects of globalization on income distribution within rich and poor countries 
are a matter of controversy. While international trade theory in its most abstract 
formulation implies that increased trade and foreign investment should make 
income distribution more equal in poor countries and less equal in rich countries, 
finding these effects has proved elusive. The paper presents another attempt to 
discern the effects of globalization by using the new data derived directly from 
household surveys. The paper looks at the impact of openness (trade/GDP ratio) 
and direct foreign investment on  relative income shares across the entire income 
distribution. In contrast to what one would expect from theory, we find strong 
evidence that at low average  income level, it is the rich who benefit from 
openness. As income level rises, that is around the income level of $5-7,000 per 
capita at international prices, the situation changes and it is the relative income of 
the poor and the middle class that rises compared to the rich. It seems that 
openness makes income distribution worse before making it better—or differently 
that the effect of openness on  income distribution depends on country’s average  
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1. Introduction: Globalization and its effect on income distribution 
 
  The issues of globalization and income inequality have during the last ten years received a 
huge attention. Most of it, however, was concentrated on the effects of globalization on within-
country inequality in rich economies. In other words, the discussion was mostly on how 
globalization is (or might) affect wage and income inequality in the United States or Western 
Europe (e.g. Slaughter and  Swagel 1997;  Dluhosch, 1998; Schott, 1999). A second strand of the 
literature was focused on how globalization might affect world or international income 
distribution principally via differences in mean per capita growth rates between the countries  
(see Milanovic, 1999;  Milanovic and Yitzhaki, 1999; Melchior et al. 1999; Schultz 1998, Sala-i-
Martin 2002). 
  
One recently has there been more interest in how globalization affects within-country 
distribution in  less developed countries, LDC (Cornia and Kiiski, 2001;  Lustig and Kanbur,  
1999;  Ravallion 2001; Galbraith 2002).  There is also a discussion of  the effects of   
globalization on LDC’s growth and technology transfer (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp, 1999).  
There are theoretical models of income distribution as affected by trade (e.g. Wood, 1998; 
Benarroch and Gaisford, 1996; Kremer and Maskin, 2003). The detailed empirical analyses of 
the effects of economic change, including market reforms and increased integration, on within-
country income distribution are limited mostly to Latin American countries.   Hanson and 
Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2000) study wage inequality in the wake of Mexican trade 
reforms; Beyer, Rohas and Vergara (1999) look at the similar issue in the context of Chile; 
Arbache (1999) studies the effect of market liberalization on inter-sectoral wage dispersion in 
Brazil; Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001)  assess the effects of various policy changes 
(including trade liberalization and capital account opening) on wage differentials in Latin 
America.   
 
Particularly relevant to this paper which deals with the cross-country analysis are the two 
recent papers by World Bank researchers. In both cases, the main objective was to look at the 
relationship between openness and growth, but  both papers provided some interesting—even if 
conflicting—evidence on the relationship between openness and inequality. Lundberg and Squire  3
(1999) consider growth and inequality to be simultaneously determined. They find, in  an 
unbalanced panel comprising more than 700 observations from 125 countries and  covering the 
period 1960-1998, that openness, measured by the  Sachs-Warner (0-1) indicator, has either no 
effect or a mild negative effect on income growth of the bottom quintile. However  the higher 
one moves along the income distribution ladder, the more significant and positive are the effects 
of  openness on income growth (Lundberg and Squire, 1999, pp. 31-32).
2 The implication of the 
Lundberg-Squire results is that the effect of openness on income distribution varies in function of 
level of development (country’s mean income).  This is very similar to the results obtained by 
Barro (2000) and Ravallion (2001, p. 1811): they also find statistically significant non-linearity 
in the relationship between openness and inequality, with openness associated with increased 
inequality in poor countries.  
 
A different conclusion is reached by  Dollar and Kraay (2000). They also use an 
unbalanced panel covering the same period and (almost exactly) the same countries as Lundberg 
and Squire, and find first, that openness (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP)  is 
positively associated with per capita income growth, and second, that this effect carries across all 
income quintiles.
3  Trade has no systematic impact on inequality. The implication of their finding 
is  that trade is neutral to income distribution, and since trade is good for growth, the effects 
across all income groups are the same—where the “same”  means that each decile’s gain is 
proportional to its initial income. (In other words, of course, the rich benefit more in absolute 
amount, but not in relative terms.) Similarly, Birdsall and Londono (1997 and 1998), report no 
differences between growth in income of the poorest quintile and other quintiles due to trade 
variables, though initial distribution of land and education do matter. Finally, Li, Squire and Zou 
(1998) have, in one of the sensitivity runs of their main model,  export-to–GDP (a proxy for 
openness) as an explanatory variable of the Gini coefficient. They find no statistically significant 
effect of openness on the Gini coefficient. 
                                                 
2 They also find  that openness is a trade-off variable: its effect is positive for growth, negative for equality (the 
result obtained when using the Gini coefficient to measure inequality). 
 
3 There are some definitional differences compared to Lundberg and Squire. For example, Dollar and Kraay “space” 
observations on the mean income of the poorest quintile by at least five years. They do so in order to avoid relying 
in their estimation on too many annual and adjacent income distribution statistics from the rich countries. In 
addition, it is reasonable to be concerned with the medium-term effects of growth on inequality—a fact which would 
be obfuscated by overreliance  on annual data.  
  4
 
These different findings—especially because they are derived by using very similar data 
sources—have generated intense discussion. Dollar and Kraay (2000, pp. 16-18) address some 
empirical and methodological differences between their paper and that by Lundberg and Squire. 
A recent paper by Ravallion (2001) attempts to find out where the difference in results comes 
from, and to “reconcile” their findings. Birdsall (2001) argues that Dollar and Kraay fail to 
distinguish between the effects of negative growth spells on the poor vs. others, and that 
volatility including some spells of negative growth is more likely in more open economies.
4  
 
Thus, in conclusion, we have inconsistent results regarding the effects of openness on 
inequality. On the one hand, Li, Squire and Zou (1998),  Birdsall and Londono (1998),  and 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) find that openness has no systematic and significant effect on 
inequality. On the other hand, Lundberg and Squire (1999), Barro (2000) and Ravallion (2001) 
find that openness has a negative effect on equality in poor countries, and moreover, in some 
formulations,  that it has a negative effect on real income of the poorest 40 percent of people. 
The conclusions thus run the full gamut, from openness having a negative effect on real income 
of the poor, to raising income of the poor less than income of the rich in relative terms, to raising 
both the same (in relative terms, again). Note however, that there are no results that show 
openness reducing inequality, that is raising real income of the poor by more (in percentage 
terms) than income of the rich. Let alone raising absolute incomes of  the poor by more. 
 
The new data base 
The objective of this paper is to provide some additional empirical evidence on how 
globalization affects income distribution in developed and developing countries using the newly 
developed data base created in the context of the work on world income distribution. The 
advantages of World Income Distribution (WYD) data base are twofold: (i) it is entirely based 
on national household surveys “anchored” around three benchmark years (1988,  1993 and 
1998), so that income inequality data are almost fully mutually comparable (that is, they are all 
derived from nationally representative surveys)
5; (ii) it gives not one or two synthetic  inequality 
                                                 
4 The latter point is also argued in Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001). 
 
5 There are problems though. Some surveys are income- and some expenditure-based. However, since countries 
generally “specialize” in  producing either one of the other type of survey, it is mostly the “cross-over” countries  5
measures (say, Gini coefficient or Theil index) but the actual data on income levels across ten 
deciles of income distribution. It thus describes practically the entire income distribution which 
none of the papers reviewed above has been able to do. This ability to look at what is happening 
behind a change in one summary statistic is crucial if we want to get a better grasp on how 
globalization affects the entire distribution. The total number of available surveys with decile 
data is 321  with 95 countries (surveys) in 1988, and 113 countries both in 1993 and 1998. 
Almost  2/3 of deciles are calculated from individual (micro) level data.
6  There are 82 countries 
(called common sample countries) with decile data for all three years. Incomes are expressed in 
$PPP (international dollars) of each benchmark year but since we are interested in within-
country distributions, the currency used is irrelevant (the share of a decile is the same whatever 
currency we use). 
7 However, the use of PPP data is relevant if we want to adjust for the impact 
of openness in function of level of development or income of a country (e.g. openness might 
have a different impact in a poor compared to a rich country). 
 
The coverage of world income and population by the WYD data  is shown in Table 1. 
Additional details regarding the data sources and surveys are given in Milanovic (2004, 
forthcoming, Chapters 9 and 10) and Milanovic (2002, Appendix 1). The data are available at  
www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/data.  
Table 1. Coverage of world GDP and population by household survey data (in percent) 
  Population  GDP (in US$) 
  1988 1993 1998 1988 1993  1998 
        
Africa  48.0 76.1 67.1 48.7 85.2 71.2 
Asia  92.5 94.9 94.4 94.4 93.2 95.6 
E.  Europe/FSU  99.3 95.2 100 99.4 96.3 100 
LAC  87.4 91.8 93.0 90.2 92.8 95.2 
WENAO  92.4 94.8 96.6 99.3 96.2 96.3 
World  87.3 92.4 91.6 96.5 95.4 96.0 
Source: Milanovic (2004; forthcoming). WENAO is Western Europe (inclusive of Israel), plus Northern 
America, and Oceania (more exactly, Australia and New Zealand only). LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(those that in one year use income and in another year expenditure survey) that pose problems. Their number 
however is limited. There are 9 such cases out of 113 surveys in 1993, and 13 such cases (out of 113 surveys)  in 
1998.   
 
6 The proportions differ between the years though. In 1988, the percentage is 44; in 1993, it is 55, and in 1998, it is 
70.  
 
7 About 1/3 of all available distributions are expenditure-based. In order to simplify the writing, we shall always 
refer to income distributions though.   6
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we look at the definition of globalization 
and what are the channels through which it may affect within-country income distributions. In 
Section 3, we propose a simple model on how globalization affects income distribution. Section 
4 gives some descriptive statistics of the data with an emphasis on the measures of globalization. 
Section 5 gives the estimates of the regressions. Section 6 presents our findings and gives some 
policy implications.  
 
2. What it means to be “globalized”? 
 
It is sometimes useful to begin with the official definition. The official World Bank 
definition of globalization is “Freedom and ability of individuals and firms to initiate voluntary 
economic transactions with residents of other countries”. Empirically globalization translates 
into greater mobility of the factors of production (capital and labor) and greater world integration 
through increased trade and exchange of ideas. Several recent papers that compare the two 
globalization waves, the one at the end of the last century up to 1914, and the current one thus 
look precisely at these indicators (Bordo, Eichengreen, and  Irwin, 1999, Williamson, 1996, 
Craft, 2000, Baldwin and Martin 1999): how much trade there is now (as the share of world 
GDP) compared to a century ago, how much direct and portfolio foreign investment, and how 
easy it is for people to move or to settle in different countries. The studies come with a mixed 
verdict on the past vs. current globalization. Portfolio investments and trade as a share of world 
GDP are about the same now as then, direct foreign investment is greater as is the ease of travel, 
but the ability to resettle elsewhere is less. Thus, it appears that both labor and capital are in 
some sense more, and in some sense less, mobile than they were a century ago, and that trade is 
about as important now as it was then. However, our objective here is to look at how thus 
defined and empirically understood globalization affects income distribution. . 
 
Consider first the effects of openness on less developed countries. They are affected 
principally in two ways. First, they are able to export more of their own goods (and to import 
more), and they can be expected to be recipients of direct foreign and portfolio investments from 
the capital-rich countries. According to the simple version of the Heckscher-Olin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model, less  developed countries will tend to export low-skill-intensive products (because  7
low-skill labor is their abundant factor and its is therefore low). Second, and for similar reasons, 
foreign investors will also tend to invest in low-skill intensive processes. Moreover as the more 
advanced countries have an advantage in skill-intensive products and tend to export these, there 
should be also a reduction in relative wages of highly-skilled workers in less developed 
countries. When we translate this into what it should imply for income distribution, and 
approximate the latter by the ratio between  high-skill and low-skill wage, it appears that income 
inequality within the LDCs should go down. Mirroring these developments, income distribution 
in more developed countries should become more unequal. This is directly derived from  factor 
price-equalization theorem in its most abstract formulation (see Freeman, 1995 and caveats 
therein), and is argued, for example in  Wood (1995, 1999).  
 
Moreover, as less developed countries continue their process of modernization which 
implies improvement in educational attainment, the relative supply of high-skill workers   
increases compared to low-skill workers (although  not to the extent that it would reverse the 
comparative advantage of the country). This seems to further reduce the wage difference 
between the high- and low-skilled workers and to shrink wage (and thus income) distribution. In 
conclusion, relative demand shifts occasioned by globalization would tend to favor less-skilled 
workers in LDCs, and so do relative supply shifts brought about by better educational 
achievement. The reverse would, of course, hold for rich countries where globalization would 
tend to favor high-skilled workers although that effect should, in the longer-term, be lessened by 
their greater supply. 
 
What may be the offsetting elements? There are, at least, two. First, rather than looking at 
globalization through HOS lenses, we may look at it as a Kuznetsian process. Suppose that 
instead of two types of labor (low- and high-skill) we have three types of labor (low-, medium-, 
and high-skilled). Globalization may produce movement of labor from low-wage sector 
(agriculture) where wage differentiation is minimal, to medium-skill sectors (in urban areas) 
where wage differences are larger. Then, even if the ratio between the top and bottom shrinks 
(that is, the ratio between high-skill and low-skill wage becomes smaller), overall wage (and 
hence, we assume for the moment) income inequality might increase simply because of the 
greater wage differentiation in the middle. In conclusion, the ratio between the average wages of 
different types of labor is not sufficient to describe what happens to the distribution.   8
 
In effect, as soon as we move from the very simplifying HOS assumptions of two types of 
labor, the effects of trade (and globalization) on income distribution in developing countries 
become ambiguous.  In a model developed by Wood (1994), there are three types of labor 
(skilled, intermediate and unskilled). Then, very poor countries that open up may experience 
increased inequality because demand generated by openness helps those with basic and high 
education (that is those with intermediate and high skills) and reduces the income share of those 
with no education. This introduces not only greater realism in the assumptions, but highlights the 
fact that speaking of a single effect of globalization on developing countries may be wrong. Poor 
developing nations with abundance of unskilled agricultural labor may  experience an increase in 
inequality (e.g. Bangladesh), while those that enter globalization with a mostly educated labor 
force, and where primary education is the norm (e.g. South Korea) might see increased trade 
bring about  lower inequality. 
 
Second, although wages constitute, even in developing nations, the largest chunk of total 
income, there are two other income sources that affect income inequality significantly. They are 
self-employment income (including home-consumption), and capital (property) income. The 
share of self-employment income would tend to go down as people move from subsistence 
agriculture (this assumes that peasants are mostly land-owners), to becoming  wage-workers. The 
importance of capital income will depend on the distribution of wealth and on what happens to 
the real interest rate, whose level is, in turn, dictated by what happens in rich countries. This is 
particularly so in an era of globalization, and more or less free movement of capital. Since 
property income is strongly concentrated among  top income classes,  that element might provide 
a strong countervailing force to decreasing inequality—much greater in effect than a simple 
share of capital income in total income would imply.  
  9
 
3. Channels of influence on the entire income distribution and estimation issues 
 
By definition, absolute income level of  the i-th decile in the j-th country at the time t can 
be written as a function of  an inequality index (Ijt) and mean income of the country (mjt).
8 
 
) , ( jt jt ijt m I f y =              ( 1 )  
 









=             ( 2 )  
 
 
We then assume that level of  the  inequality index depends on the levels of the variables 
listed below.  
 
(1) two “standard” globalization variables, namely openness (OPENj) measured as the sum 
of exports and imports in country’s GDP, 
10 and direct foreign investment as a share of 
GDP (DFIj),  
 
(2) financial depth (FDj), the ratio of  M2-to-GDP, introduced on the assumption that 
greater financial depth should reduce the importance of the financial constraint to 
borrow for education purposes, and thus should help those who are talented but lack 
resources (see, for example, Li, Squire and Zhou, 1998), and 
 
(3) an indicator of democracy (DEMj), on the assumption that democratization, through the 
median voter hypothesis, should lead to a reduction in inequality (see Gradstein, 
Milanovic, Ying, 2001 and all other papers mentioned in the literature review by   
Gradstein and Milanovic, 2000) 
 
                                                 
8 Deciles go from the poorest, 1, to the richest, 10. 
 
9  The movement from (1) to (2) implies the homogeneity assumption 
 
10 We use the standard measure of openness in order not to stray from the rest of the literature. Note however that in 
this measure exports and imports are treated unevenly: an increase in exports rises both the numerator and the 
denominator (since exports are a component of GDP) while the same increase in imports rises only the numerator, 









=  where X=exports, M=imports and D=domestic demand.  10
Financial depth and democracy are not thought to be linked directly with globalization 
even if one might plausibly entertain such a view too. For example, one can regard increasing 
financial depth, that is increasing monetization of the economy, to proceed directly from better 
integration of a country into the international economy, and democratization to occur  in 
response to greater international exchanges.  However, we view these two variables as controls 
for the “non-globalization related” part of the influence on income distribution, and orthogonal to 
the “globalization-proper” variables. We introduce them primarily to avoid misspecification of 
our model. We then rewrite (2) in the reduced form as  
 
) , , , ( jt jt j jt
jt
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m
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However, we need also to take into account the fact that the globalization variables will not 
affect the share of a given decile the same regardless of country’s level of development. Consider 
the following fact. Increased openness and direct foreign investments will, as the theory tells us, 
tend to benefit low-skilled workers in poor countries since it would be these low-skill-intensive 
industries which would be both attractive to foreign investors and likely to take advantage of 
export opportunities. Thus, we would expect that the signs of  OPEN and DFI variables will be 
positive among the bottom deciles in poor countries. For a rich country, the situation is exactly 
the reverse. Openness will mean that it is the low-skilled workers in rich countries that would be 
exposed to increased foreign competition; low-skill intensive products are likely to be imported 
by  rich countries, and we would expect that the signs of OPEN and DFI variables will be 
negative in a rich country setting. The coefficients of the two globalization variables  will 
therefore vary in function of the income level of the country. Ideally, of course, the coefficients 
should vary in function of the skill composition of each income decile and country’s income 
level. However, since we do not have information on who exactly is in each decile and what is 
the skill composition of people per decile, we shall use country’s income level to interact with 
the openness variable. Interaction between OPEN and income has been used in at least several 
papers: by Barro (1999), Ravallion (2001), and Dollar and Kraay (2002).  
 
We can write (omitting time subscripts) for each decile: 
  11
eij DEMj i FD i mj DFIj i DFI i mj OPENj i OPEN i i
mj
yij




The β coefficients vary across deciles and thus subscripted. We expect the signs of β i5 and 
β i6 associated with respectively financial depth and democracy to be positive among the low 
deciles, and  negative among the higher income deciles—on the hypothesis that  lack of deep 
financial markets (inability to borrow against one’s future income) is bad for the poor and for 
equality, and that democratization should likewise help the poor by leading to greater 
redistribution.   
 
There are ten pooled cross-section regressions: one for each income decile run across all 
countries with the same independent variables. The regressions such as (2b) can be run 
independently (with one omitted) or as a simultaneous system (seemingly unrelated regressions) 
with a constraint. 
11  The constraint ensures  that the sum of coefficients adds up to zero: this is 
necessary since an increase in the share of some deciles must be balanced by the decrease in the 
share of other deciles. Because of shares’ likely autocorrelation (within country and across 
years), the regressions are run with robust (Huber/White) standard errors.  
 
There are two additional problems: (i) the introduction of income as explanatory variable 
and endogeneity, and (ii) robustness of  the results to the introduction of other variables.  
 
If we believe that income and inequality are jointly determined, there  is  the issue of 
endogeneity. The argument that income affects inequality and should hence be included on the 
RHS is  based on some variant of the Kuznets-type relationship. However, whether one 
subscribes to the Kuznets hypothesis or not, it is clear that income serves only a proxy for several 
structural changes—transfer of labor from a more equally distributed agriculture to a more 
                                                 
11 If we assumed that the slopes are homogeneous across countries and that intercepts are “fixed” (different between  
countries), we could use fixed-effect (FE) estimator.  The advantage of the FE (or first-difference) estimator lies in 
the fact that it allows us to argue that marginal effects of openness (and other explanatory variables) are the same 
across countries while letting inequality be determined (through varying intercept) by other unobservable country-
specific effects. This seems quite reasonable. The problem however is that our panel is very short (three 
observations only) and that since shares, within county, change but slowly most of the data  variability is contained 
in cross-sectional observations. Thus, the use of the FE estimtor yields very poor results. The same problems plague 
random-effect estimation (none of these results are reported here).    12
unequal industry, or educational change (increasing share of highly skilled people and decreasing 
education premium), or demographic change (increasing share of the elderly and rising social 
transfers)—which are all associated with a rising GDP per capita. Once we “solve in” for income 
by introducing its structural correlates like financial deepening and democracy, there is no 
additional  independent role played by income. This is the reason why we do not introduce 
income as independent variable in (2b).   
 
The endogeneity problem may plague both openness and other RHS variables.  Inequality 
might influence financial depth, or democracy, or government spending (variable introduced 
below). To adjust, in part, for it, all RHS variables are calculated as five-year lagged averages. 
There is a substantive reason for it too: to reflect the fact that openness or financial depth do not 
affect income distribution instantaneously. Time is required to do so.   We address endogeneity 
also by instrumenting  the possibly endogenous variables by their lagged values and using GMM 
(generalized method of moments) estimator whose efficiency properties are superior to those of 
traditional IV/2SLS estimators. 
 
The robustness of the results can be questioned as well because our RHS variables could  
reasonably include other variables that may affect income shares such as the extent of 
government spending, or real rate of interest. The first is expected to be pro-poor, the second, 
due to a typically high concentration of assets in the hands of the income-rich, to be pro-rich.  




4. Descriptive statistics  
 
Before trying to link globalization and other macro variables to changes in income 
distribution, we need to define the variables more precisely. For the distribution, we use the data 
on annual per capita $PPP incomes of each decile from 321 surveys and 129 countries in total  
(with 82 countries being a balanced panel). As mentioned before, the income data are for  the 
benchmark years 1988, 1993, and 1998.  Each decile contains 10 percent of individuals (not 
households) of  a country.  
 
All RHS variables are calculated as the averages over a five-year period. There are two 
reasons for this rather than simply using a single value for 1988, 1993 and 1998. First, the 
distribution data are only “benchmarked” in 1988, 1993 and 1998. The actual surveys which we 
use to calculate the decile data might have been conducted in the years around 1988 (say, 1986 
or 1989). The situation is the same for the benchmarks years of  1993 and 1998. Overall, 
however, more than 70 percent of surveys are within a year of the benchmark; more than 90 
percent of surveys are within two years of the benchmark date. 
.  
Second, even if all the surveys were conducted in the same year, there would be some 
advantage in relating changes in mean incomes to, say, several years’ average share of exports 
and imports in GDP. This in order to avoid having the results being swamped by “noise”, that is 
very short run changes. As mentioned before, globalization is reflected in two variables: 
openness—share of combined exports and imports in GDP—and  the share of direct foreign 
investments in GDP of the recipient country. Thus openness that is associated with income 
distribution around 1988 is taken to be the average of exports and imports over GDP during the 
five-year period ending in 1988 (that is, 1984-88). Likewise, openness that is associated with 
income distribution in 1993 and 1998 is defined as the average over respectively 1989-93 and 
1994-98  periods. Identical calculations are done for all other RHS variables.  
  14
Table 2 shows mean-normalized average incomes of each decile in 1988, 1993 and 1998. 
For example, we see that on average (calculated across all countries)
12 in 1988, the bottom 
decile’s income was 30.7 percent of the mean. The same decile calculated across the common-
sample countries received an income equal to 30.3 percent of the mean. By 1993, the bottom 
decile’s income was only 23.5 percent of the mean in one case and 24.4 percent in the other. 
Finally, in 1998, it declined even further to 23.3 percent of the mean. Note that between 1988 
and 1993, relative incomes of the bottom eight deciles went down—with the negative change the 
largest among the poor deciles—while the relative income of the top two deciles went up, again 
with the greatest positive change among the very top. The situation changed between 1993 and 
1998. All deciles between the second and the seventh (inclusive) gained, while the very bottom 
decile and the three top deciles lost (all of course in  relative terms). The situation with the 
common-sample countries is quite similar.   
 
Table 2. Mean-normalized average incomes of each decile  
(across countries, not weighted for population) 
 
Note: Deciles formed based on per capita income or expenditures (obtained from household surveys). The 
decile ratio is the ratio between the average income of the tenth and the first decile. 
 
Table 3 shows the recent upsurge in globalization as reflected in the openness variable. It 
shows the increase in the combined share of exports and imports in GDP, all at current prices. 
There is a sustained increased in the (unweighted) share of openness from around 70 percent in 
the mid-1980’s to more than 90  percent at the turn of the century. The (dollar) weighted share of 
                                                 
12 Each country is one observation regardless of its population size.  
  All countries  Panel (common sample countries) 
  1988  1993  1998 1988 1993 1998 
First  0.307  0.235  0.233 0.303 0.244 0.233 
Second  0.441  0.375  0.380 0.437 0.391 0.387 
Third  0.539  0.476  0.482 0.535 0.495 0.491 
Fourth  0.635  0.571  0.581 0.631 0.593 0.590 
Fifth  0.736  0.677  0.686 0.733 0.701 0.697 
Sixth  0.855  0.804  0.810 0.853 0.831 0.821 
Seventh  1.000  0.959  0.962 1.000 0.984 0.972 
Eighth  1.201  1.182  1.181 1.202 1.207 1.188 
Ninth  1.541  1.566  1.552 1.548 1.580 1.553 
Tenth  2.745  3.156  3.138 2.757 2.973 3.068 
Total  1  1  1 1 1 1 
Number of 
countries 
95 113 113  82  82  82 
Decile ratio  8.9  13.4  13.5  9.1  12.2  13.2  15
trade in world GDP similarly increased by almost a full 10 percentage points from 37 to 46.5 
(see Table 4). The higher unweighted trade/GDP average ratio reflects the fact that smaller (and 
poorer) countries’ trade shares are greater. It is notable that consistently the most closed 
economies are Brazil and Japan.  The most open economy is almost throughout Singapore. 
 
Table 3. Share of combined exports and imports in GDP  
(unweighted; cross country) 
 
Year Number  of 
countries 
Average share of  
openness  










1985  124  72.8  13 (Lao)  317 (S’pore)  70.7 
1986  125  67.5  10 (Iran)  308 (S’pore)  66.0 
1987 128  68.1  10(Sudan)  341(S’pore) 67.0 
1988 129  69.1  15(Sudan)  375(S’pore) 69.5 
1989 130  73.5  13(Sudan)  362(S’pore) 71.6 
1990 132  76.5  14(Brazil)  539(Suriname)  73.3 
1991 130  75.0  15(Brazil)  399(Suriname)  72.6 
1992 140  75.9  16(Tajik)  385(Suriname)  70.1 
1993 150  76.8  16(Japan)  326(S’pore) 72.6 
1994 152  79.7  16(Haiti)  331(S’pore) 75.7 
1995 154  82.8  16(Brazil)  339(S’pore) 80.2 
1996 155  83.9  15  (Brazil)  328(S’pore) 83.1 
1997 155  84.9  17  (Brazil)  317(S’pore) 85.0 
1998  153  86.8  17 (Brazil)  457(Eq. Guinea)  86.0 
1999 152  85.3  19(Japan)  313(S’pore) 85.1 
2000 149  91.9  20(Japan)  341(S’pore) 94.0 
 Source: Own calculation from World Development Indicators; World Bank. SIMA (Statistical Information 
Management and Analysis) database, World Bank. The number of common sample countries is 82. 
 
The increase in openness was registered in all the regions (Table 4). The increase was very 
large in transition economies, Latin America and Asia. In 2000, Asia and transition economies 
(Eastern Europe and FSU) had the highest unweighted openness. It is remarkable that differences 
in openness between the continents are relatively small, and that the view, often expressed, of 
insufficient integration of Africa in global economy is belied by these numbers.
13 Openness of 
Africa is not much different, or is even higher, from that of the rest of the world. In 2000, for 
example, Africa’s trade-to-GDP ratio was 62 percent, some 15 percent higher than that of the 
                                                 
13 For example, Yusuf  (2003, p. 68) in an article on globalization points to “inability of African countries to 
integrate with world economy.” 
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rich world (not shown in the table).
14 Africa’s low share in total world trade simply mirrors its 
low share in total world income.  Or differently put, the “problem” with Africa may not be trade 
but small size of domestic markets. 
 
For 85 countries whose openness increased between 1985 and 2000, the average 
unweighted change was 27 GDP points. The most significant increases were registered by 
Malaysia (127 percentage points), Angola (107), and Hong Kong (87). For 32 countries where 
openness  decreased, it did so by an average of 15 GDP points. The most significant decreases 
were for Mauritania (52), Bahrain (49), and the Bahamas (48). Openness for several of the 
largest (by GDP) countries went up. For example, for the US it increased from about 16 to 24 
percent of GDP, for China, from 20 to 49, for India, from 15 to 30, from Brazil, from 19 to 23 
percent, for Germany from 42 to 67 percent. But, on the other hand, for Japan, openness went 
down from 24 to 20  percent of GDP. 
 
Table 4. Openness (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP 
(unweighted regional averages unless stated otherwise) 
 








Africa  62.9 68.4 73.2  +10.3 
Asia  72.1 80.8 91.7  +19.6 
Latin  America  57.8 72.2 78.7  +20.9 
Eeurope/FSU 64.0 61.6 84.6  +20.6 
WENAO  71.0 69.3 75.7 +4.7 
World    70.4 75.8 83.5  +13.1 
World (dollar 
weighted) 










Source: Own calculation from World Development Indicators; World Bank. SIMA Database, World Bank. 
The openness ratios for each period are calculated as the means  of five-year averages of all the countries (this is 
exactly the same definition as used when creating the variables for the regression analysis below). These values are  
slightly different than if the period openness ratios were calculated as the means of all individual countries’ 
openness ratios for these years (the reason is that for some country/years openness ratios may be missing). 
 
Even more dramatic were increases in foreign direct investments as percentage of GDP of 
the recipient countries. The unweighted importance of foreign direct investments increased from 
less than 1 percent of GDP in the late 1980’s to 4.6 percent in 2000 (Table 5).  The increase was 
                                                 
14 This is the dollar-weighted openness (the ratio between total value of Africa’s trade and its total GDP).   17
most dramatic in the second part of the 1990’s (see Table 6) when the importance of  DFI 
measured in terms of total world output doubled. 
 
If we compare the amounts of DFI’s in 1985-90 and ten years later (1995-2000), for 62 
countries the share of DFI inflows in GDP increased by an average of more than 3 GDP points,  
while for only seven countries DFI became less important. In  ten countries (Lesotho, Ireland, 
Bolivia, Sweden, Panama, Denmark, the Netherlands, Chile, Czech republic, and Bulgaria) the 
share of direct foreign investment in GDP in the most recent period exceeded by more than 5 
GDP percentage points their share in the late 1980’s. For China, the importance of DFI went up, 
over the same period, from an average of 0.5 percent of GDP to between 3 and 4 percent of 
GDP. India, which started with almost no direct foreign investments, reached some ½ one 
percent of GDP in the late nineties. In the US, similarly, the share went up from 0.5 percent of 
GDP to between 2 and 3 percent. As we have recently  come to expect (Lucas 1990), per capita 
DFI (in current dollar terms) and GDP per capita (also in current dollar terms) are  positively 
associated with each 10 percent increase in income accompanied by a little over 10 percent 
increase in foreign  investments. 
15  
                                                 
15 The hypothesis of unitary elasticity is accepted: income elasticity was somewhat greater in the first than in the last 
five-year period.   18
Table 5. Foreign direct investment as percentage of recipient 
country’s GDP (unweighted average) 
 
Year Number  of 
countries 
Percentage of GDP  Maximum a/ 
1985  65  .70  5.7 (New Zealand) 
1986  65  .67  4.2 (New Zealand) 
1987  66  .84  3.5 (New Zealand) 
1988 67  .86 4.2  (Lesotho) 
1989 68 1.17  7.9  (Nigeria) 
1990 70 1.25  6.2  (Zambia) 
1991 70 1.17  8.1  (Malaysia) 
 
1992 80 1.13  8.8  (Malaysia) 
 
1993 82 1.39  7.5  (Malaysia) 
 
1994 82 1.79  8.3  (Nigeria) 
 
1995 82 2.28  29.5  (Lesotho) 
 
1996 83 2.39  30.5  (Lesotho) 
 
1997 83 3.22  26.1  (Lesotho) 
1998 83 4.13  29.7  (Lesotho) 
1999 81 4.17  24.6(Sweden) 
2000 81 4.63  24.3  (Ireland) 
a/  Luxembourg, which in all years has the highest share of direct foreign investment in GDP is not shown.  
Source: Own calculations from UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
1996, 1997, 2000.   19
 
Alike trade, the flow of direct foreign investment has increased in all regions of the world 
with the most significant unweighted increases occurring in Africa, Latin America, and transition 
economies (Table 6). 
16 
 
Table 6. Direct foreign investment as percentage of GDP 
(unweighted regional averages unless stated otherwise) 






Change in DFI 
Africa 0.9  1.3  3.8  +2.9 
Asia 0.5  1.2  1.6  +1.1 
Latin America  0.7  1.4  3.5  +2.8 
Transition economies  0.0  0.6  3.0  +3.0 












Number of countries  67  82  88   
Source: Own calculations from UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
1996, 1997, 2000. The period averages are calculated as explained in Table 4. 
 
We are less interested in the other two control variables, financial depth (M2/GDP) and 
democracy. The former is measured in a straightforward fashion, as the ratio of M2 to GDP (see 
Table 7). The dramatic decline in financial depth in transition economies is due both to the very 
high level of money to GDP ratio before the transition, 
17 and then to the effects of hyperinflation 
which reduced real money balances. Democracy is measured by the Democracy variable from 
PolityIV database created by Monthy Marshall, Keith Jeggers, and Ted Gurr.
18 The variable  
ranges from 0 (absence of democracy) to 10 (best).  
                                                 
16 In dollar-weighted terms, the picture is somewhat different. For example, in the five-year period ending in 1998, 
the unweighted DFI/GDP was 3.8 percent for Africa and 2.2 percent for WENAO (see Table 6); but the GDP-
weighted percentages were respectively 1.7 and 1.4.  
 
17 This was known as “the money overhang” problem: too much cash chasing too few (price-controlled) goods. 
There was some recovery in monetization however in 1999 and 2000 (not shown in Table 7). 
 
18 The data are available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. Democracy is defined as “general openness of 
political institutions.”   20
 
Table 7. M2 as percentage of GDP 
(unweighted regional averages)






Change    
Africa 47  38  37  -10 
Asia 68  82  78  +10 
Latin America  30  31  33  +3 
E. Europe/FSU   76  33  28  -48 
WENAO 60  63  65  +5 
World   53  50  48  -5 
Number of countries  66  76  80   
Source: Own calculations from  World Development Indicators, World Bank (SIMA database). The period 
averages are calculated as explained in Table 4. 
 
 
Democracy variable shows a sustained increase in democracy in  all the regions over the 
three  periods. The most important gains were registered in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Population-weighted democracy, largely held back by the absence of progress (as 
measured by the variable) in China, also improved although less than  unweighted democracy. 
 
Table 8. Democracy proxied by the Polity IV Democracy variable  
(unweighted regional averages unless stated otherwise) 
 







Africa  1.1 1.5 3.0  +1.9 
Asia  3.0 4.2 5.0  +2.0 
Latin  America  5.5 7.0 7.8  +2.3 
Eeurope/FSU    0.1 4.2 6.0  +5.9 
WENAO  9.5 9.7 9.8  +0.3 
World    3.5 4.8 5.9  +2.4 










Number of countries  129  129  130   
Source: Own calculations from Polity IV database.  Democracy index ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 
(most democratic). For explanation on how the index is  derived, see Polity IV available at 





5. Estimation of the regressions 
 
We estimate ten level regressions for each formulation, with the first formulation being the 
most parsimonious one 
 
eij DEMj i FD i mj DFI i DFI i mj OPEN i OPEN i i
mj
yij




where all the variables and coefficients are already explained, and subscript t is omitted for 
simplicity. All the RHS variables are five-year averages except in the IV estimation below where 
we use contemporaneous data. The results of the simultaneous decile estimation (seemingly 
unrelated regressions or SURE) are shown in Tables 11-13. The results of instrumental variable 
estimation are shown in Table 14. 
 
The first regression is an unbalanced panel run across 207 decile shares in years 1988, 
1993 and 1998. As can be seen in Table 11, for all the deciles between the second and the 
seventh, increased openness negatively affects their income shares. However, the negative effect 
of openness is lessened for richer countries as the interaction term between openness and mean 
income is positive. Openness would therefore seem to have a particularly negative impact on the 
poor and  middle-income groups in poor countries—which is directly opposite to what we would 
have expected based on standard theory.  It is only when income level (calculated from 
household surveys) reaches a little over $4,000 in purchasing power terms, that is around the 
income level of  Malaysia and Brazil, that for the poor and the middle classes openness becomes 
a “good thing”—that is, raises their share in total income.  22
 
How large is the openness effect? Let us suppose that we are looking at a poor country 
whose mean income is $PPP 2,000 per capita, and whose second decile’s share of total income is 
about 4 percentage points (an average value in our sample). The  second decile’s mean income is 
therefore $PPP 800. Let now the trade/GDP ratio increase from 0.7 to 0.9 (again, an about 
average change between 1985 and 2000). This will reduce the decile's share of the total pie to 
about 3.9 percent, or absolute income to $PPP 780 (of course, absent any other effect including 
change in total income).
19  
  
For the top two deciles, openness exerts the opposite effect. It raises incomes of the rich in 
poor countries, and its positive effect on the rich is reduced as mean income increases. For mean 
income levels around $4,000, the impact of openness on the income share of the rich becomes 
negative. On balance, therefore, openness is pro-equality in rich countries and pro-inequality in 
poor countries. 
 
Direct foreign investments have a very small negative effect on the income of the poor in 
poor countries, but otherwise they are not statistically significant. Financial depth, as we would 
expect, increases income share of the poor and middle class, while democracy has no significant 
effect.  
 
The regressions in Table 12 are the same as in Table 11 except that we now add real rate of 
interest among explanatory variables.
20 The main  thrust of the results is unaffected except that 
democracy now becomes positively related to the shares of the two middle deciles. R
2 increases 
                                                 
19 This is obtained as follows. At $PPP2000 and openness=0.7, the sensitivity of the ratio variable is -0.09*0.7 + 
(0.00002 * 0.7 * 2000) = -0.035 which means that, with an infinitesimal increase in openness, the share  of the 
bottom decile will go down by 0.35 percent (0.035 multiplied by 10 since the regression is run across relative 
incomes). If we now keep everything the same and change only openness to be 0.9, the effects is -0.045. So, the 
effect  due to a parametric 20 percentage point increase in the trade share is a decline of 0.1 percent in the decile’s 
income share.  
 
20 The nominal  interest rate is the deposit rate on 12-month deposits as reported in IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (various issues; the variable is 60L...ZF). The real rate is obtained by deflating the nominal by the 12- 
month consumer price index (also as reported in International Financial Statistics).  The data are available on World 
Bank SIMA.  
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significantly to an average value of 0.3
21 as real interest rate enters as a rather strong predictor of 
decile shares. It is shown to be statistically strongly anti-poor throughout the whole income 
distribution, again a result that is not unexpected. Income shares of the top two deciles are 
increased by higher interest rate. How strong is this effect? Income share of the top decile is 
about 30 percent (of total country income). Each percentage point increase in real rate of interest 
raises that share by almost 0.1 percent. In other words, real income of the rich (assuming the size 
of the pie to be fixed) goes up by 1/3 of one percent. 
 
Since (1) the period 1988-98 was characterized by rising income inequality (see Table 1) 
and (2) there is a pro-rich effect of high interest rates, it is interesting to look at changes in real 
interest over the same years.  The unweighted average real interest rate across countries in our 
sample shows a mild increase. For example, during 1996-2000, the average real interest was 
always positive ranging between less than 1 percent and more than 3 percent p.a.; but during  
1985-90 period, the rate was negative in three out of six years. The number of countries with 
negative real deposit interest rates is also smaller now although it is not negligible (there were 17 
out of 69 countries with negative real interest rates in 2000). The introduction of real interest in 
the regressions pushes the turning point of the effect of openness on decile shares past the $5,000 
mark; in other words, openness becomes pro-poor only at higher average income levels.  
 
In the regressions shown in Table 13, we add  government expenditures expressed as a 
share of GDP.
22 Similarly to what we found when adding real interest rate, the R
2 and the 
precision of the estimates go up. Openness remains as before anti-poor in poor countries and pro- 
poor in rich countries, direct foreign investment is not significant, and democracy is shown to 
have a positive effect on the income shares of the middle classes (fourth to eight decile).This is 
an interesting result which suggests that earlier works which have failed to detect the effect of 
democracy on inequality (Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying, 2001, but 
for an exception see Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001) might have done so because democracy   
                                                 
21 Notice that throughout R
2’s for middle income groups are higher than those for the low deciles. This is not 
surprising: explaining income of the poorest members of a society is generally more difficult since the role played 
by idiosyncratic factors is greater. 
 
22 The data on government expenditures are the sum of central government (consolidated accounts), local and state 
or provincial government’s expenditures. The data are taken from the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics 
available on-line in  World Bank SIMA database.   24
affects primarily income shares of the middle groups while leaving unchanged those at the top 
and the bottom. In consequence, synthetic inequality measures like the Gini coefficient may not 
show much change. 
 
Government expenditures have a positive effect on the shares of all low and middle-
income deciles, and a negative effect on the shares of the two top deciles.  For example, a ten 
percentage point increase in government expenditures/GDP ratio raises the bottom decile’s share 
of the pie (total country’s income) by 0.2 percent. This represents almost one-tenth of what the 
bottom decile receives on average (see Table 2). 
 
Finally,  in Table 14, we show the results of GMM estimates. Openness and government 
expenditure as a share of GDP which may be thought to be endogenous are instrumented by their 
lagged values and country’s population. The Hansen J statistics (test of overidentifying 
restrictions)  is throughout insignificant indicating that instruments are valid. R
2’s remain high 
and most of the conclusions are unchanged. Openness reduces income share of all deciles 
between the third  and the seventh, and raises the income share of the top decile. The turning 
point now occurs at a higher average income level, around $PPP7,000 where  countries such as 
Spain and Israel are located. Government expenditures and financial depth are pro-poor as 
before, and high real rate of interest is anti-poor. Democracy is now insignificant throughout.   
 
In conclusion, the results of the level regressions that  when a country is relatively poor, 
increased openness raises the income share of the top, and reduces the income share of the poor 
groups as well as of the middle class. (We are throughout talking of  “shares”, not absolute 
incomes.) However, at some medium- to high level of average country income, between 
$PPP4,000 and $PPP7,000 per capita depending on the specification, the income shares of the 
poor and the middle class begin to be positively affected by openness while the income  share of 
the rich begins to decline. Finally, for the rich countries, openness is associated with an 
increasing share of the bottom and middle deciles, and a decreasing share of the top deciles.  
Openness thus helps inequality chart an inverted U shape as income level increases. At low 
income levels, openness is bad for equality; at high income level it promotes equality.  
  25
This suggests that only the middle-income countries may behave as the rigorous version of 
the theory would imply. But poor countries whose equality should be helped by openness, and 
the rich countries where openness should increase income differentials, behave in the exactly the 
reverse fashion from what we would expect. These results are only partly  consistent with those 
posited by Wood (1994), or Kremer and Maskin (2003). In both models, poor countries that open 
up may experience increased inequality because there are various types of labor  by skill, and  
openness helps those with middle and high level of education, but reduces the income share of 
those with no education. In Kremer and Maskin (2003), the latter are basically “unemployable” 
by rich countries’ firms because of their low productivity (they cannot be “matched” with more 
skilled workers), and hence globalization marginalizes them. It is only when basic education 
becomes the norm—and even the poor have it—that openness exerts an income-equalizing 
effect. This is what we might be picking up in the results which show at some middling level of 
income, the share of the lower and middle income classes begins to rise. In other words, a 
strategy based on exports of manufactures that require at least basic education would be 
equitable in Korea but inequitable in Burkina Faso or Pakistan (Wood 1994, quoted in Kanbur, 
1998).  However, in Wood’s and Kremer and Maskin’s models, rich countries too exhibit 







                                                 
23 To be more exact, Kremer and Boskin (2003, p.17) are agnostic about the effect on inequality in rich countries: 
inequality may go up or down  26
 
Table 11. Explaining mean-normalized decile incomes (1988, 1993, 1998): Parsimonious formulation 




Note: Statistically significant (at 1 and 5 percent levels) coefficients are shaded. The p-values between brackets. 
  First Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth Sixth  Seventh Eighth Ninth  Tenth 
Open5 -0.055  -0.090  -0.093  -0.095  -0.087  -0.076  -0.056  -0.010 0.057  0.511 
  (.074)  (.007)  (.005)  (.003)  (.004)  (.006)  (.022)  (.643) (.139)  (.009) 
Open5*mean  0.0000164  0.000023  0.000022  0.0000232  0.0000215  0.0000182  0.0000136  0.0000047  -0.000015  -0.000129 
income  (.001)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.15)  (.010)  (0) 
DFI5  -0.005  -0.0029  -0.006 -0.0069 -0.008 -0.0094 -0.0089  -0.007  0.0016  0.048 
  (.932)  (.664)  (.341) (.291) (.192) (.094) (.072)  (.11)  (.833)  (.233) 
DFI5*mean  -0.0000036  -0.0000033  -0.0000024  -0.0000024 -0.000002 -0.0000011 -0.00000045  0.00000065  0.0000021  0.000012 
income  (.012)  (.030)  (.116) (.106) (.155) (.352)  (.687)  (.517)  (.233) (.160) 
M2gdp5  0.0905  0.103  0.0931  0.0829  0.0724  0.0638  0.0512  -0.0291 -0.00035  -0.5846 
  (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.005)  (.009)  (.011)  (.021)  (.141) (.920)  (.001) 
Democr5   -0.002 0.0009 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0017 -0.00037  -0.001  -0.008 
  (.287)  (.705)  (.454) (.328) (.266) (.224) (.359)  (.822) (.647)  (.567) 
Constant  0.228  0.356  0.490  0.562  0.670  0.797  0.956  1.178  1.56  3.22 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
No  of  obs  207  207  207 207 207 207  207  207  207 207 
"R-sq"  0.182  0.259  0.278 0.293 0.297 0.296  0.252  0.095  0.072 0.281  27
Table 12. Explaining mean-normalized decile incomes (1988,1993, 1998). Adding real rate of interest 
(regressions estimated simultaneously; dependent variable: decile mean income/overall mean income) 
 
 
  First Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth Sixth    Seventh  Eighth  Ninth Tenth 
Open5  -0.071  -0.112  -0.117  -0.118  -0.109  -0.097  -0.075  -0.025 0.065  0.664 
  (.025)  (.001)  (.001)  (0)  (0)  (.001)  (.002)  (.250) (.089)  (.001) 
Open5*mean  0.0000177  0.000024  0.000023  0.0000235  0.0000215  0.000018  0.0000131  0.0000038  -0.0000172  -0.00012 
income  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.250)  (.003)  (0) 
DFI5  -0.0001812  -0.0022  -0.00556  -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008  -0.006  -0.00035 0.0435 
  (.977)  (.745)  (.411) (.359) (.244) (.124) (.094)  (.137)  (.963)  (.274) 
DFI5*mean  -0.0000034  -0.0000032  -0.0000022 -0.0000022 -0.0000018  -0.000001 -0.00000036  0.00000063 0.0000019 0.000012 
Income  (.016)  (.038)  (.141) (.128) (.185) (.404) (.743)  (.524)  (.269)  (.183) 
M2gdp5  0.1095  0.1296  0.1173  0.1073  0.096  0.087  0.0741  -0.0497  -0.0000689  -0.76687 
  (.001)  (0)  (.001)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.004)  (.030)  (.862)  (0) 
Democr5   -0.002  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.0046  0.004  0.004  0.002 -0.00057  -0.022 
  (.328) (.492) (.234)  (.114)  (.061  (.033)  (.035)  (.126) (.851)  (.162) 
Rint5  -0.00111  -0.0015  -0.001  -0.0016  -0.0016  -0.0015  -0.0014  -0.0009  0.002  0.009 
  (.014)  (.002)  (.001)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.003)  (0)  (.001) 
Constant  0.217  0.339  0.442  0.541  0.649  0.776  0.936  1.164  1.578  3.35 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
No  of  obs  179  179  179 179 179 179 179  179  179  179 
"R-sq"  0.223  0.322  0.347 0.367 0.375 0.380 0.343  0.162  0.145  0.353 
 
Note: Statistically significant (at 1 and 5 percent levels) coefficients are shaded. The p-values between brackets. 
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Table 13. Explaining mean-normalized decile incomes (1988,1993, 1988: Ading government expenditures as share of GDP 
(regressions estimated simultaneously; dependent variable: decile mean income/overall mean income) 
 
  First Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth Sixth    Seventh  Eighth  Ninth Tenth 
Open5  -0.068  -0.113  -0.113  -0.113  -0.104  -0.091  -0.066  -0.007  0.098  0.577 
  (.044)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.014)  (.789)  (.029)  (.005)        
Open5*mean  0.0000078  0.0000138  0.0000131  0.0000133  0.0000123  0.0000104  0.0000069 0.00000036  -0.000019  -0.000058 
Income (.205)  (.032)  (.040)  (.030)  (.033)  (.050)  (.153) (.938)  (.022)  (.118) 
DFI5  0.0000397  -0.002 -0.0055  -0.0066  -0.007 -0.008 -0.009  -0.008  -0.0042  0.05 
  (.995)  (.741)  (.397) (.336) (.236) (.121) (.079)  (.076)  (.614)  (.190) 
DI5*mean -0.00000214  -0.0000018 -0.0000011  -0.0000012 -0.000001 -0.0000006  -0.00000009  0.0000007 0.000002  0.0000055 
Income  (.151)  (.222)  (.456) (.408) (.438) (.630) (.937)  (.527)  (.316)  (.540) 
M2gdp5  0.1222  0.1321  0.119  0.107  0.097  0.088  0.076  -0.059  -0.008  -0.811 
  (.001)  (.001)  (.003)  (.005)  (.007)  (.007)  (.013)  (.037)  (.874)  (0) 
Democr5   -0.003  0.0018  0.004  0.0056  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.005  -0.0014  -0.034 
  (.302) (.542)  (.17) (.048)  (.017)  (.006)  (.006)  (.020)  (.717)  (.050) 
Rint5  -0.001  -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0016  -0.0016  -0.0015  -0.0014  -0.0009  0.002  0.009 
  (.007)  (.001)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.007)  (0)  (0.001) 
Expgdp5  0.259  0.331  0.323  0.310  0.286  0.237  0.172  0.055  -0.163  -1.810 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.172)  (.023)  (0) 
Constant  0.132  0.231  0.330  0.428  0.541  0.684  0.865  1.126  1.613  4.050 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
No  of  obs  140  140  140 140 140 140 140  140  140  140 
"R-sq"  0.347  0.499  0.519 0.539 0.547 0.541 0.473  0.220  0.218  0.519 
 
 
Note: Statistically significant (at 1 and 5 percent levels) coefficients are shaded. The p-values between brackets. 
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Table 14 Explaining mean-normalized decile incomes (1988,1993, 1998) 
(GMM/IV estimation;  dependent variable: decile mean income/overall mean income) 
 
  First Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth Tenth 
Openness -0.030  -0.0818  -0.096  -0.104  -0.097  -0.089  -0.071  -0.009 0.065 0.505 
























Expgdp  0.281  0.35  0.340  0.328  0.307  0.258  0.193  0.072  -0.1559  -1.976 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (.058)  (.008)  (0) 
M2gdp  0.106  0.121  0.112  0.099  0.086  0.077  0.0624  0.042 0.0604  -0.769 
  (.003)  (0.001)  (.003)  (.007)  (.012)  (.014)  (.026)  (.101) (.152) (.001) 
DFI  -0.007  0.0004  0.0013  0.002  0.0014 0.0004  0.0006  -0.0016 -0.0012  -0.00035 
 (.891)  (.941)  (.823)  (.710)  (.778)  (.926) (.878)  (.655) (.824)  (.991) 
DFI*mean 
income 
-0.0000016  0.0000014  0.0000011 0.0000014 0.0000012 0.0000008  0.0000050  0.00000025  -0.00000087  -0.0000069 
  (.181) (.270) (.426)  (.341)  (.382)  (.567) (.737)  (.850) (.472)  (.466) 
Rint   -0.0022  -0.0030  -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.003  -0.0026  -0.0017  0.004  0.018 
  (.018)  (.009)  (0.006)  (.011)  (.013)  (.018)  (.03)  (.100)  (.033)  (.018) 
Democracy  0.00095 0.0032 0.0044 0.005 0.0058 0.006  0.0053  0.0047 -0.0024  -0.0324 
  (.800) (.404) (.256)  (.186)  (.127)  (.093) (.101)  (.115) (.594)  (.205) 
Constant  0.098  0.194  0.297  0.403  0.519  0.6644  0.852  1.118  1.637  4.230 










0.445    
(0.504)     




0.944       
(.331) 
1.053      
(.305) 
1.571    
(.210) 
0.775     
(.379) 
                    
No of obs  119  119  119  119  119  119  119  119  119  119 
Centered R
2 0.354 0.500 0.518  0.526  0.526  0.508 0.427  0.182 0.238  0.504  30
Note: Statistically significant (at 1 and 5 percent levels) coefficients are shaded. Openness and government expenditure as share of GDP are 





The effects of globalization on income distribution within rich and poor countries are a 
matter of controversy. While international trade theory in its most abstract formulation implies 
that increased trade and foreign investment should make income distribution more equal in poor 
countries and less equal in rich countries, finding these effects has proved elusive.  
 
Here we have tried to discern the effects of globalization by using data from household 
surveys and by looking at the impact of openness (trade as share of GDP) and direct foreign 
investment (as percent of the country’s GDP), on  relative income shares of low and high deciles. 
We are thus able to chart as it were the effect of globalization on the entire income distribution in 
both poor, middle-income and rich countries. We find rather robust  evidence that at a very low 
income level, it is the rich who benefit from openness. As income level rises, that is for countries 
with survey-incomes of between $4-7,000 at international prices,  the situation changes and the 
relative income of the poor and the middle class rises compared to the rich (top two deciles). It 
seems that openness makes income distribution worse before making it better—or differently 
that the effect of openness on country’s income distribution depends on initial income level.  
 
These results run counter to simple factor-price equalization theorem with two types of 
labor. They are however consistent with a view propounded by Wood (1994) and more recently 
Kremer and Boskin (2003) that, with three types of labor (no education, basic, and highly 
skilled), openness in very poor countries might increase inequality by helping those with basic 
education, and leaving even further behind those with no education. Only when the poor become 
reasonably skilled, can the low  deciles share begin to benefit from incresed labor demand; then 
inequality falls. This seems to provide a strong argument for free basic education, and for the 
strong externality effects of more educated population. 
 
As for the other variables, we do not find any effect of direct foreign investments on 
income distribution. We find that democracy raises income shares of the middle deciles and 
leaves those of the top and the bottom unchanged (thus possibly explaining why synthetic 
measures of inequality like the Gini coefficent have generally failed  to detect an effect of  32
democracy on inequality). Government expenditures and financial depth, as expected, do help 
increase income shares of the bottom and middle income groups and lower those of the top. Real 
rate of interest—a topic which surprisingly has attracted very little attention—is always pro-rich. 
Even middle classes lose (in relative share) when real interest is high. 
 
Increased trade seems to result in greater inequality, that is reduced income share of the 
poorest deciles in poor countries. Those who, according to economic theory and according to 
policy prescription of international organizations, should benefit the most from increased trade 
appear, on the contrary,  to be losers in relative terms. The case for trade as an engine of growth 
for the poorest of the poor is not however irretrievably lost. It must be based on trade’s impact on 
average incomes which, if sufficient, might lift real incomes of the poor as well. The case 
however cannot be made, we think, on trade’s favorable impact on income distribution.  
 
 




Arbache, Jorge Saba (1999), “How do economic reforms affect the dispersion and structure 
of wages? The case of an industrialising country labor market”, paper presented at the 1999 
Rayal Economic Society conference in England, typescript. 
 
Barro, Robert (2000), “Inequality and growth in a panel of countries”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, vol. 5, pp. 5-32. 
 
Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., Stillman, S., (2002), “Instrumental variables  and GMM:  
Estimation and testing”, Working paper no. 545, Boston College Department of Economics. 
Available at  http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/WP545.pdf.  
 
Baldwin, Richard E. and Philippe Martin (1999), “Two Waves of Globalization: 
Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences”, January 1999,NBER Working Paper No. 
6904. 
 
Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2000), “New tools and new tests in 
comparative political economy:  The Database of Political Institutions”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2283, February 2000. 
 
Benarroch, Michael and James D. Gaisford (199 ), “Economies of Scale, International 
Capital Mobility, and North-South Inequality”, Review of International Economics,  
 
Beyer, Harald, Patricio Rojas and Rodrigo Vergara (1999), “Trade liberalization and wage 
inequality”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 59, pp. 103-123.  
 
Birdsall, Nancy and Juan Luis Londono (1997), “Asset Inequality Matter: An Assessment 
of the World Bank’s Approach to Poverty Reduiction”, American Economic Review, vol. 87, 
May,  pp. 32-37. 
 
Birdsall, Nancy and Juan Luis Londono (1998), “No Trade-off: Efficient Growth via More 
Equal Human Capital Accumulation” in Nancy Birdsall, Carol Graham and Richard Sobot (eds.) 
Beyond Tradeoffs: Market Reforms and Equitable Growth in Latin America, Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank and Brookings Institutions, pp. 111-145. 
 
Bollen, K. and R.W. Jackman, 1985, “Political democracy and the size distribution of 
income,” American Sociological Review, 50, 438-457. 
 
  Bordo, Michael D., Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin (1999), “Is Globalization Today 
Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?”, NBER Working Paper No. W7195, 
June 1999. 
 
Borjas, Jorge (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, Journal of Economic Literature, 
vol. 32, pp. 1667-1717.  34
 
Craft, Nicholas (2000), “Globalization And Growth In The Twentieth Century”, 
Background paper to IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000, mimeo, January. 
 
Dluhosch, Barbara (1998), “Globalization and European Labor Markets”,  October 1998, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1992. 
 
Easterly, Bill, Roumeen Islam and Joseph Stiglitz (2001), “Volatility nad Macroeconomic 
Paradigms for Rich and Poor Countries”, in Jacques Dreze (editor), Advances in Macroeconomic 
Theory, New York: Palgrave. 
 
Freeman, Richard B. (1995), “Are your wages set in Beijing?” , Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 9 (Summer), No. 3, pp. 15-32. 
 
Gradstein, Mark, Branko Milanovic and Yvonne Ying (2001), "Democracy and Income 
Inequality: An Empirical Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Working Papers Series  No. 
2561,  February.   
 
Gundlach, Erich and Peter Nunnenkamp (1996), “Some Consequences of Globalization for 
Developing Countries”, August 1996, Kiel Working Paper 756, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft. 
 
Harrison, Ann and Gordon Hanson (1999), “Who gains from trade reform? Some 
remaining puzzles”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 59, pp. 125-154.  
 
Kanbur, Ravi (1998), “Income distribution and development”, November, typescript.  
 
Kremer, Mark and Eric Maskin (2003), “Globalization and Inequality”, unpublished 
manuscript.  
 
Lejour, Arjan M. And Paul J.G. Tang (1999), “Globalisation and wage inequality”, CPB 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic policy Analysis, typescript. 
 
Lucas, Robert (1990), “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 80, No, 2, pp. 92-96. 
 
Milanovic, Branko (2002), “True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First 
calculation based on household surveys alone”, Economic Journal., vol. 112, No. 476, January, 
pp. 51-92. 
 
 Milanovic,  Branko  (2004),  Worlds Apart: Global and International Inequality 1950-2000, 
forthcoming.  
 
Murphy, Kevin and Finis Welch (1992), “The structure of wages”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 107, pp.285-326. 
  35
Ravallion, Martin (2001), ”Growth, inequality and poverty: looking beyond averages”, 
World Development,  vol. 29, n11, November, pp.1803-15 
 
  Robertson, Raymond (2000), “Trade Liberalisation and Wage Inequality: Lessons from the 
Mexican Experience”, World Economy, vol. 23, n6 (June 2000): pp. 827-49. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2002), “The Disturbing ‘Rise’ of World Income Inequality”, NBER 
Working paper No. 8904, April. Available at www.nber.org. 
 
Schott, Peter K. (1999), “One Size Fits All? Specialization, Trade and Income Inequality”,  
October 31, 1999. 
 
Slaughter, Matthew J. and Phillip Swagel (1997), “The Effect of Globalization on Wages 
in the Advanced Economies”, International Monetary Fund Staff Studies for the World 
Economic Outlook, December 1997. 
 
Tavares, Jose and Romain Wacziarg (2001), “How Democracy Affects Growth”, 
European Economic Review, vol. 45, pp. 1341-1378.  
 
Tang, Paul J.G. and Adrian Wood (1999), “Globalisation, Co-Operation Costs and Wage 
Inequalities, January 1999, mimeo.  
 
Williamson, Jeffrey G. (1996), “Globalization and Inequality Then and Now: The Late 
19th and  Late 20th Centuries Compared”, March 1996, NBER Working Paper 5491.  
 
Wood, Adrian (1994), North-South trade, employment and inequality: changing fortunes 
in a skill-driven world,  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Wood, Adrian (1995), “How trade hurt unskilled workers”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, volume 9 (Summer), No 3, pp. 57-80. 
 
Yusuf, Shahid (2003), “Globalisation and the Challenge for Developing Countries”, 
Journal of African Economies, vol.12, AERC supplement, pp. 35-72. 